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A positive correlation between insurance coverage and ex post risk can be an indicator for private
information in insurance markets. However, this test fails if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes.
We propose a new test that conditions on unobserved types of individuals who differ in their risks
preferences. This makes it possible to detect asymmetric information without direct evidence of private
information - even if agents have heterogeneous risk attitudes. We apply our technique to the market
for long-term care insurance. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) provide direct evidence for the existence
of private information in this market. At the same time they fail to find a positive correlation between
insurance coverage and ex post risk. Our method indicates the existence of private information, without
using direct evidence of private information. Our methodology is applicable to other insurance markets
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Economic theory suggests that the presence of private – or asymmetric – information has 
important implications on insurance markets.
2  Adverse selection and moral hazard can lead to a 
sub-optimal provision of insurance and a decrease in welfare. Therefore, it is important to detect 
and to quantify the effects of asymmetric information in insurance markets.   
One indicator for the presence of asymmetric information is a positive correlation 
between an individual’s risk and the decisions to purchase insurance (after controlling for public 
information).
3  This indicator does not require to directly observe private information and it has 
been used to investigate a number of insurance markets.   
The empirical results, however, are mixed and differ by markets. For example, in a life 
insurance market, Cawley and Philipson (1999) conclude that the mortality rate of U.S. males 
who purchase life insurance is below that of the uninsured, even when controlling for many 
factors such as income that may be correlated with life expectancy. In an auto insurance market, 
Chiappori and Salanié (2000) find that accident rates for young French drivers who choose 
comprehensive automobile insurance are not statistically different from the rates of those opting 
for the legal minimum coverage, after controlling for observable characteristics known to 
automobile insurers.   
In contrast, Cohen (2005), using data from Israel, shows that new auto insurance 
customers choosing a low deductible tend to have more accidents, leading to higher total losses 
for the insurer. In an annuity insurance market, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) observe systematic 
relationships between ex post mortality and annuity characteristics, such as the timing of 
payments and the possibility of payments to the annuitant’s estate, but they do not find evidence 
of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. He (2009) draws a complete different 
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conclusion with the existing literatures, by producing evidence for the presence of asymmetric 
information in the life insurance market. In particular, she presents a significant and positive 
correlation between the decision to purchase life insurance and subsequent mortality, conditional 
on risk classification.   
One existing explanation for failure to detect the private information is the presence of 
heterogeneous preferences for insurance. De Meza and Webb (2001) suggest that there may be 
advantageous selection, which means that more cautious people are not only more inclined to 
purchase insurance but also more likely to put effort in preventing risk exposures. The presence 
of both adverse selection and advantages selection may create insignificant or even negative 
correlations between an individual’s risk exposure and the decision to purchase insurance even 
with private information. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006), short F&MG, introduce variables that 
measure cautiousness and wealth quartiles. These variables are expected to be correlated with 
insurance demand and risk exposures. They find that these variables positively related to 
insurance demand and negatively related risk exposures. They explain this result with the 
existence of multiple types of insurance costumers. More cautious and wealthier individuals are 
more likely to purchase long-term care insurance and less likely to enter a nursing home. In other 
words, the presence of asymmetric information is masked by heterogeneous risk attitudes or 
heterogeneous insurance demand. However, their framework still fails to find private information 
even after introducing factors about individual heterogeneity, despite a direct evidence of private 
information when available.   
Fang, Keane and Silverman (2008) also provide evidence of advantageous selection. 
They find that having Medigap insurance would be associated with $4,000 less in total medical 
expenditure if not controlling for health status, and $2,000 more in total medical expenditure if 
controlling for health status. This result indicates that those who purchase Medigap insurance are 
healthier, providing evidence of advantageous selection.     4
This paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, we identify the reasons for 
failure to detect the private information in the current empirical framework even in the presence 
of the factors that are related to individuals’ heterogeneity of insurance demand. As discussed in 
F&MG, the presence of individual heterogeneity may cause the problem. However, including 
factors that are related to individual heterogeneity may not solve the problem as long as we only 
have an incomplete set of factors that explain the individual heterogeneity.   
Second, we present an alternative test for the private information in the presence of 
heterogeneous preferences for insurance. We assume that individuals can be grouped into two 
types. The timid type has a stronger taste for insurance and is less likely to experience the insured 
event. The bold type has a weaker preference for insurance and a higher risk of experiencing the 
insured event. The test of a positive correlation between an individual’s risk and the decision to 
purchase insurance is only valid if conditioning on either type. Since types are not observed, we 
use the mixture density to jointly model the risk and insurance purchase. Several characteristics 
that are correlated with the unobserved types are used to probabilistically determine which type 
the person belongs to. The advantage of this method is that an incomplete set of variables that 
explain the individual heterogeneity is normally sufficient to produce consistent estimates in the 
insurance demand and risk exposure equations, and to detect private information if it exists. The 
literature has been using the mixture density to identify unobserved types. Examples include Lee 
and Porter (1984), Keane and Wolpin (1997), Knittel and Stango (2003), and Gan and Mosquera 
(2008). Henry, Kitamura, and Salanié (2010) explain conditions for identification of finite 
mixtures. 
Third, we apply this model to the sample of F&MG. The advantage of the F&MG sample 
is that the direct evidence of private information is available. We find that the two types of agents 
behave differently as predicted. The timid are more likely to purchase insurance but less likely to 
enter the nursing home than the bold. Conditional on public information and the type of an 
individual we obtain a statistically significantly positive correlation between ex post risk and the   5
insurance purchases. This provides the evidence of the existence of private information. Allowing 
for two types of individuals makes it possible to detect the presence of private information. We 
confirm the finding of F&MG without relying on direct evidence of private information. 
Moreover, we also confirm that the timid type would be more likely than the bold type to 
purchase the insurance policy but less likely to use insurance, as predicted by the theory.   
Our method is most useful for insurance markets where such direct evidence of private 
information is not complete or even not available. It may uncover the existence of private 
information while simultaneously account for heterogeneity in risk attitudes and reveal the 
existence of asymmetric information without the direct evidence of private information.   
The paper is organized as follows, in section 2 we illustrate the identification problem 
and explain how it is possible to account for heterogeneity in risk preferences. Section 3 describes 
the data and presents the results. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. An Empirical Strategy to Detect Private Information in the Insurance Market 
We empirically characterize the market for long-term care insurance (LTCI) through two 
equations. The first equation relates individuals’ characteristics to the probability of entering a 
nursing home. The second equation relates the same characteristics to the decision to purchase 
long-term care insurance.   
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We use X to denote characteristics that are public information – information that is 
available to both the individual and the insurance provider. Individuals may have information 
about the likelihood of eventually entering a nursing home that is not available to the insurer. We 
denote this private information by Z. Without loss of generality we define Z so that βZ > 0. A 
higher probability of entering a nursing home creates an incentive to purchase long-term care 
insurance. As Z is not reflected in insurance premiums, this leads to a positive relationship   6
between Z and insurance purchases, δZ > 0. Further, we include H to denote individual taste for 
insurance or individual risk attitude. We define H so that δH > 0, a higher value of H implies a 
higher likelihood of purchasing insurance. At the same time, as pointed out by de Meza and 
Webb (2001), and supported by empirical evidence in F&MG and Fang, Keane and Silverman 
(2008), a higher value H is associated with a lower level of ex post risk, i.e., βH < 0. While both 
private information Z and individual heterogeneity H are unobserved, they exhibit different 
effects on insurance purchase and ex post risk. The coefficients for the private information, βZ and 
δZ have the same sign in the equations characterizing insurance purchase and ex post risk. The 
coefficients for individual heterogeneity, βH and δH, have opposite signs in the two equations.   
Finally, since all common factors have already been conditioned in (1), the error terms u and v are 
assumed to be distributed standard normal    ~0 , 1 uN  and    ~0 , 1 vN , and are independent on 
each other, Cov(u, v) = 0. 
  If it is not possible to observe Z or H, the two equations can be estimated only partially: 
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The resulting error terms are given by:  u Z H u Z H     
*  and  v Z H v Z H     
* .  
If individuals have homogeneous risk preferences or insurance demand, there is no 
variation in H. The correlation between the error terms is given by: 
    0 ,
' '
1
* *    Z Z Z Z v u Cov     (3)   
with βZ > 0 and δZ > 0. Therefore, the presence of unobserved private information leads to a 
positive correlation, and estimating ρ1 offers a way to empirically test for the presence of 
asymmetric  information.   
However, this test can fail to detect the presence of private information if individuals 
differ in their inclination to purchases insurance.    With heterogeneous risk preferences the 
correlation of the error terms is described by:     7
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 (4)     
The first term in (4),  Z Z Z Z  
' ' , is assumed to be positive in the presence of private 
information. However, the second term  H H H H  
' '  is  negative  if  βH and δH have opposite signs. 
In other words, if individuals with a low risk of nursing home use (βH < 0) tend to have a taste for 
insurance (δH > 0), the correlation of the two error terms in (4) is no longer indicative of the 
presence of asymmetric information, but rather a combination of asymmetric information and 
heterogeneous taste in insurance. Further, the signs of the remaining two terms in (4) cannot be 
determined without further assumptions. Without observing H the sign of ρ2 in (4) cannot be 
determined ex ante. 
In general it is not possible to observe H. However, it may be possible to observe a set of 
variables W that are related to H. F&MG propose such variables: wealth, adoption of preventive 
health activities, and seat belt usage. They use these variables to estimate the following model,   
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If W fully characterizes H, the correlation between the error terms can be used to test for 
private information. However, if W only represents a subset of variables that characterizes H, the 
problem remains. For example, let H be fully characterized by observed W and unobserved M: 
  H =aW + M + ε, (6) 
then the error tem in the NH model in (5) is  u M Z u H Z       
* , and the error term in the 
LTCI model in (5) is  v M Z v H Z       
* . The correlation between u
* and v
* is given by:   
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 (7) 
Again, similar to ρ2 in (4), the sign of ρ3 cannot be determined ex ante without further 
assumptions. The first term in (7),  Z Z Z Z  
' ' , is assumed to be positive in the presence of private   8
information, and the second term in (7), H H M M  
' ' , is negative if βH and δH have opposite signs. 
But the signs of the remaining two terms in (7) cannot be determined without further 
assumptions. Therefore, it is possible that ρ3 is not positive even if private information is present.   
However, in the following discussion, we show that it is possible to solve this problem if 
we are willing to assume that the heterogeneity in the risk preferences can be captured by 
allowing each individual to be one of two types with an individual specific probability.     
In particular, we assume that there are bold (B) or timid (T) individuals. H takes two 
values, HB and HT.
4  Given this assumption, we can rewrite equations in (1) for each type.    For 
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In both equations in (8), the effect of H is absorbed into the constant terms, 
T c  and 
T c . 
Similarly, for the bold type individuals (H = HB), we obtain: 
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Again, the constant terms 
B c  and 
B c   absorb the effect of H while the error terms 
include the private information. The model predicts the relative magnitude of the constant terms. 
Everything else equal, a timid type individual would be more likely to purchase LTCI but less 
likely to enter the nursing home than a bold type individual, i.e. 
B T c c     and 
B T c c    . More 
importantly, the error terms u
* and v
* now only include the private information Z, but not the 
individual heterogeneity. Therefore, the correlation between u
* and v
* reflects the presence of 
private information Z. Imposing the two-type structure transforms the problem from one of 
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identifying HβH and HδH in (1), to a problem of identifying
  TB c  and 
  TB c , and – at least 
probabilistically – the type of an individual.   
We need to jointly identify 
T c , 
T c , 
B c , 
B c ,  X  ,  X  , the probability of belonging to 
a certain type, and the correlations between the two error terms u
* and v
* . Conditional on X and 
W, we observe four possible outcomes, (NH=i, LTCI =j ), for i = 0, 1 and j = 0, 1.    The 
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   (10)    
As described in equation (6), H is determined by W and M.    We assume that the 
probability of being of a certain type varies with W: 
      Pr , Pr TT HH W M HH   , for some W and M. (11) 
If we assume that W is observed but M is not observed, it is not possible to consistently 
estimate the coefficient in the equation below:   
     0 Pr , | Pr        M W M W H H T  (12) 
Assuming that the unobserved M can be written as a linear function of W and an error 
term, i.e., M = Wα + τ ; equation (12) can be rewritten as   
     0 Pr 0 Pr | Pr
*                W W W W H H T  (13) 
where the random errors τ and ε are normally distributed, and the parameter γ
* is the sum of γ and 
α, scaled by a constant such that ω ~ N (0, 1). In the linear model, γ may be consistently estimated 
if M is uncorrelated with W (where α = 0 ). However, in the nonlinear setting here, γ cannot be 
consistently estimated regardless of the correlation between M and W.  
The key identifying assumption is that – conditional on the type of an individual – W and 
M are not related to either the probability of entering a nursing home, or the probability to 
purchase long-term care insurance:     10
      Pr , | , , Pr , | TT NHi L T C I j HH W M N Hi L T C I j HH      (14) 
Consequently, any association between W and M and the probability of entering a 
nursing home or purchasing insurance is solely driven by the association between W and M and 
the probability to belong to a certain type. In a separate paper, Henry, Kitamura and Salanié 
(2010) also propose this independence condition as one of the key assumptions of identifying the 
model.  
  Intuitively, this identification assumption is similar to the identification assumption of 
the instrumental variable model. W and M may be considered as the “instrumental variables” for 
the type variable H. They are assumed to be uncorrelated with NH and LTCI but correlated with 
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Again, the relative contribution of W and M to the variation in H does not affect       
Pr(NH = i, LTCI = j) conditional on the type of an individual. Rewriting (15) conditional on the 
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All terms in (16) are defined in (8), (9), and (13). Therefore, one may construct a 
likelihood function to estimate such a model.   
Lemma: If the probability of being a certain type varies with W (equation (12)), and – conditional 
on the type of an individual – W is not related to either the probability of entering a nursing home 
or the probability to purchase long-term care insurance (equation (14)), then estimating equations 
(8) and (9) together with either (12) or (13) produces consistent estimates of the parameters 
T c , 
T c , 
B c , 
B c ,  X  ,  X  , and the correlations between the two error terms    u
* and v
*.     11
Equations (15) and (16) reveal that knowledge of M and estimation either (12) or (13) 
result in different estimates for the coefficient of W, but the other coefficients of the model are 
not affected by the fact that M is not observed. The parameters of interest,
T c , 
T c , 
B c , 
B c , βX , 
δX and the correlation between u
* and v
* remain to be consistently estimated while coefficients of 
W will not. If we have more than one dimension of information in W , we may only use a subset 
of W to estimate the model. This is very similar to the over identification test in the instrumental 
variable model where more than necessary instrumental variables are available. Similar 
discussions are also offered in Henry, Kitamura, and Salanié (2010).     
In summary, the intuition of the method is very similar to the two-stage instrumental 
variable model. The consistency of the 2SLS estimates does not require the consistency of the 
first-stage regression. Similarly, the fact that we do not observe M does not create inconsistent 
estimates of the parameters of interest. Therefore, the advantage of the proposed method is that it 
only requires some (but not full) information about H to identify the parameters of interest. Even 
the over identification test in the instrumental variable model has a corresponding test in the 
current model. In comparison, the method in the literature, as used by F&MG, replaces the 
unobserved type variable H by a set of proxies W in the NH and LTCI equations. It works only if 
W completely characterizes H. However, given how little we understand the unobserved 
heterogeneity H, this is unlikely to hold in practice.   
 
3. Data and Results 
We illustrate our estimation procedure by applying it to the data assembled by F&MG. 
The data are based on the Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) cohort of the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS). This survey is designed to be representative of the non-institutionalized 
US population born in 1923 or earlier and their spouses. For more detailed information about 
sample and variables see F&MG.   12
It is possible to observe insurance status, nursing home utilization, and a number of 
demographic and health variables that make it possible to control for risk classification of 
individuals by insurers. F&MG apply an actuarial model used by many insurers to calculate a 
variable that reflects the company prediction of nursing home use which is used to determine 
premiums. This company prediction captures the available public information, X.  
The data also contain information that is not used by insurers to set premiums. Based on a 
survey question, F&MG construct a measure of private beliefs about the likelihood of moving 
into a nursing home. We use the private believes as a proxy for private information, Z, – 
capturing some but not all of the private information of individuals. The self-reported probability 
of entering nursing home has been shown to be consistent on average with observed probabilities 
at the aggregate level, but has serious reporting errors at individual level (see, for example, Hurd 
and McGarry 2002; Gan, Hurd and McFadden 2005), suggesting that the measure can best serve 
a noisy proxy to the private information.   
The data also contain information about wealth and proxies for risk attitudes. The proxies 
for risk attitudes are self-reported seat belt usage and whether individuals undertook preventative 
healthcare measures, such as flu shots or cancer screenings.   
Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics. The sample contains 5,119 individuals. 11% of 
them have long-term care insurance in 1995 and 16% enter a nursing home at some point from 
1995-2000. However, to be comparable across various specifications, we limit our sample to 
individuals without missing information for any utilized variable. The working sample size 
consists of 5,000 observations.   
We first estimate model (2) for only one type of agent to provide a baseline for our 
further analysis. In all specifications, we control in both equations for the public information 
available to the insurance company, X, summarized by the company predictor variable.     13
The estimates reported here are similar to those reported by F&MG.
5  In the first column 
in Table 2, we confirm that the company prediction has a positive effect on the probability of 
entering a nursing home. The estimated coefficient for the company predictor ( βX ) is 1.805 
(0.090).
6  However, the insurance company predictor reduces the probability of purchasing 
insurance. The estimated coefficient ( δX ) is -0.694 (0.123), corresponding a marginal effect of 
-0.129. We obtain a negative (not significantly different from zero) estimate at -0.036 (0.041) for 
the correlation between the two error terms. In other words the correlation test does not provide 
evidence for the existence of asymmetric information.     
Next, in the second column in Table 2, we add the proxies for private information, 
individual predictions to enter nursing homes, Z, to the two equations. The coefficient for this 
variable is positive in both equations, implying that indeed private information is present.   
The third column in Table 2 displays the results for the model after we added proxies for 
the risk attitudes (types) of individuals, W, but without the individual prediction. These proxy 
variables for risk attitudes are dummy variables for “preventative health measures taken”, seat 
belt usage and for the 4
th, 3
rd, and 2
nd wealth quartile. We confirm that the coefficients for the 
variables in W have opposite signs in the two equations. F&MG argue that different signs in W in 
two equations actually indicate the heterogeneity in tastes.   
  Now, we estimate the model with two types of individuals. We jointly estimate (13), 
(8), and (9).    Let H = 1 be the timid type and H = 0 be the bold type. W consists of seat belt 
usage, preventative healthcare measures, and wealth quartiles.   
We restrict the coefficients βX, δX and the correlation ρ to be identical for the two types, 
but allow the constant terms differ. Column 1 in Table 3 displays the results (the corresponding 
marginal effects are shown in Table A2). The top panel illustrates the effect of factors predicting 
                                                 
5  To make our estimates comparable to each other our specification differs slightly from those in F&MG. 
When using the exact specifications as that of F&MG, we obtain the same results.   
6  This corresponds to a marginal effect of 0.40 if other variables are evaluated at their means (See table 
A1).   14
the type of an individual. Overall, 28% of individuals belong to the timid type. Individuals of the 
timid type are characterized by a higher incidence of preventative activities and seat belt use; they 
also tend to be wealthier. A person who takes preventative activities has a 11 percentage points 
higher probability to be the timid type. Always wearing seat belt increases this probability by 13 
percentage points. Finally, compared with individuals in the fourth (lowest) wealth quartile, 
having a wealth level in the top quartile (first quartile) increases the probability of belonging to 
the timid type by 28 percentages points, for individuals in the second quartile the increase is 20 
percentage points, and for individuals in the third quartile it is 12 percentage points.   
People who belong to different types exhibit clear differences in their behavior. As 
predicted by the model, we find that a timid-type individual is more likely to purchase the LTCI 
but less likely to enter a nursing home. For a timid-type person, the average likelihood of being 
insured is 0.41 while the chance to use nursing home is just 0.03. One the contrary, for the 
bold-type person, the average probability of purchasing long-term care insurance is less than 0.01; 
the odds of entering nursing home are 0.19. The lower panel of Table 3 displays the relationship 
between individual characteristics and insurance purchases and nursing home usage.     
As predicted in the previous subsection, the proposed model has clear predictions in 
terms of the relative magnitude of the constant terms. For the LTCI model, the estimated constant 
T c  for  the  timid type is -0.269 (0.188), significantly larger than the estimated constant 
B c  for 
the bold type at -2.312 (0.237). A one-sided Z-test rejects the null hypothesis that 
B T c c   ˆ ˆ   
(p-value = 0.000).    For the NH model, the estimated constant for the timid type
T c  is  -2.288 
(0.215), statistically smaller than the estimated constant for the bold type 
B c   at -1.269 (0.061), 
p-value = 0.000.    Both test results are consistent with the predictions of the model. In terms of 
probabilities of purchasing LTCI and entering nursing homes, the timid type would be 40 
percentage points more likely to purchase LTCI but 16 percentage points less likely to enter into 
nursing homes.     15
Most importantly, by separating individuals into two types, we are able to obtain clear 
evidence of private information. The estimated correlation between the error terms in the NH 
model and the LTCI model is positive and statistically significant at 0.621 (0.271). It is important 
to note that this is achieved without using any data on private information.   
The second set of estimates in Table 3 includes one dimension of private information, the 
individual prediction of entering nursing homes, in both the LTCI equation and the NH equation. 
As in the case of one type model in Table 2, the coefficient of this variable is positive in both 
LTCI and NH equations, showing the importance of such private information in determining both 
the decisions to buy LTCI and to enter nursing homes. Adding the proxy for private information 
reduces the correlation between the two error terms to 0.566 (0.209), although it remains positive 
and statistically significant. This result reveals that (a) the individual prediction of entering 
nursing home as elicited in the survey may only characterize a small portion of the private 
information; and (b) adding more and more private information may eventually lead to zero 
correlation, as predicted by the model.     
  Unlike the one-type model, our two-type model can detect the existence of the private 
information even in the absence of observable data on private information. If some data on 
private information is observed, our model can indicate to what extent additional unobserved 
private information influences the decision to purchase insurance.   
  As emphasized in the previous subsection, similar to the over identification test in the 
instrumental variable model, one implication of our model is that even a partial set of W may 
produce consistent estimates of the key parameters of interest. Therefore, as a further test of the 
model, we vary the choice of variables in determining types, W. In our current setting, the set W 
consists of wealth quartiles and preventive care, always wearing seat belts.    Wealth is a natural 
candidate for W. As pointed out by F&MG Medicaid offers a better substitute for private 
insurance for low wealth individuals and is therefore correlated with the risk preferences of 
individuals. It is plausible that the variables preventative care and always wearing seat belt are   16
associated with risk preferences, as well.    However, it might be argued that these variables are 
correlated with the likelihood of eventual nursing home use, violating our identifying assumption.     
  In the first two columns in Table 4, we do not include any variables in W. In column (1) 
we only include the company predictor, X, while column (2) includes individual private 
information on entering nursing homes, Z. The insurance company predictor remains positive in 
the NH equation and negative in the LTCI equation. More importantly, the constant in both 
equations satisfy the predictions of our two-type model. However, the correlation between the 
error terms in both NH equation and the LTCI equation is no longer significant. This result is 
expected since there is no information to economically distinguish the two types of consumers 
and the type is purely identified by functional form. Therefore, one of our two identification 
assumptions – the probabilities of purchasing insurance and nursing home use have to vary with 
W – is violated. 
The second column includes private information on entering nursing home. The 
coefficient estimates for the private information variable are positive and significant in both NH 
and LTCI equations. Again, the correlation between the error terms is not statistically significant.     
  The third and fourth column in Table 4 show the results when the wealth quartiles 
information is used. Our model shows that parameter estimates in both NH and LTCI equations 
should be similar to the corresponding parameter estimates in Table 3 when all available 
information in W is used. Both sets of estimates are indeed similar to each other. For example, in 
the column (3) in Table 4, the coefficient estimate for the insurance company predictor is 1.833 
(0.101) in the NH equation. The corresponding coefficient estimate in Table 3 is 1.828 (0.104).   
The coefficient estimate for constant term in NH (timid type) equation in Table 4 is -2.203 (0.237) 
while the corresponding coefficient estimate in Table 3 is -2.288 (0.215). The correlation between 
the error terms in the NH model and the LTCI model is positive and statistically significant. It is 
0.595 (0.266) without any direct information on private information and – as expected – drops to 
0.472(0.275) after adding private information in column (4).       17
  The fifth and sixth column in Table 4 list results using variables of preventive activities 
and seat belt usage with the fifth column only has the company predictor while the sixth column 
includes both the company predictor and private predictor. The coefficient estimates in both NH 
equation and LTCI equation have the expected signs and are statistically significant. The 
estimates of the constants are consistent with the predictions of our model However, the 
correlation between the error terms in the NH model and the LTCI model is no longer positive. 
This highlights the importance of the validity of the identifying assumptions for the elements of 
W. As in a standard instrumental variable approach, a violation of the identifying assumptions 
will lead to biased results.   
Table 5 presents a formal test. The test compares the estimates of the parameters of 
interest in the NH and LTCI equations presented in Table 3 and Table 4. Our theoretical analysis 
suggests that having a partial set of W may affect the estimates for the coefficient estimates for W 
in the type equation but not the coefficients in the NH and LTCI equations. The first set of 
columns in the table compares estimates from the full model with the wealth-quartile-only model, 
while the second set of columns compares estimates from the full model with the set of cautious 
activities (preventive activity and seat belt use). The first row compares the parameter estimates 
in both the NH and LTCI equations, while the second row compares the parameter estimates in 
the type-equations. As expected, the estimates in the NH and LTCI equations in two models are 
not statistically different with each other. Interestingly, the estimates in the type-determination 
equation from these two sets of estimates are not different from each other, either. One potential 
reason for this may be due to fact that the omitted sets of W (the preventive activity and seat belt 
use) are independent on the wealth quartiles.   
Finally, the second panel in table 5 compares the full model with the model with only 
prevention and seat belt usage variables as W.  The  χ
2 test statistics are very large, indicating 
that estimates from the two models are statistically different from each other for both the 
coefficients in the LTCI and NH equations and for the type equations. One possible reason is that   18
prevention and seat belt use variables may not be sufficient to identify the model. The true reason 
remains to be understood.   
 
4. Conclusions  
Identifying private information in the insurance markets is important for empirically 
testing the economic theories of moral hazard and adverse selection. It is also useful to improve 
efficiency of the insurance market. This paper proposes and estimates a new method to identify 
private information in the presence of heterogeneity consumer types. We illustrate this method for 
an insurance market where direct evidence for private information is available. We are able to 
detect the presence of asymmetric information without using this direct evidence.   
In particular, this paper makes three contributions to the literature. First, when only a 
partial set of information is available to characterize the individual heterogeneity, this study 
investigates the reason for the failure of current methods which intend to test a positive 
relationship between the demand of insurance and the usage of the service and identify the private 
information. Second, based on the discussion, this paper proposes a new method to identify 
private information with individuals’ risk heterogeneity only using a partial set of information to 
characterize such risk heterogeneity. This method assumes that individuals’ risk heterogeneity 
can be grouped into two unobserved categories. Third, although private information is known to 
be present in the long term care market, it cannot be detected by the existing method. However, it 
can be detected by the proposed method.   
The identification of this method is similar to that of the instrumental variable model. It 
requires the variables characterizing risk heterogeneity are – conditional on the type of an 
individual – uncorrelated with decisions to purchase insurance and to use the service covered by 
the insurance. The procedure described here is a tool that can be used to detect the presence of 
private information in the insurance markets with heterogeneous risk preferences even when the 
direct evidence of private information is not available.     19
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean  sd  Min  Max 
      
Nursing Home Use  0.163  0.369  0 1 
Long Term Care Insurance  0.108  0.311  0 1 
Insurance company prediction  0.218  0.231  0.006  1 
Individual prediction  0.177  0.248  0 1 
Preventive health activity  0.659  0.304  0 1 
Always wear seat belt  0.768  0.422  0 1 
Top quartile of wealth  0.285  0.451  0 1 
3
rd Wealth quartile  0.270  0.444  0 1 
2
nd Wealth quartile  0.243  0.429  0 1 
Note: The sample consists of the elderly aged 78 on average in 1995 who reported long-term care insurance status and 
nursing home use from 1995 to 2000 from the Asset and Health Dynamics (AHEAD) cohort of the Health and 
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   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
NH  Insurance company prediction  1.805*** 1.786*** 1.708***  1.683*** 
   (0.090)  (0.091)  (0.093)  (0.094) 
  Individual prediction    0.186**    0.208** 
     (0.092)    (0.092) 
  Preventive health activity      -0.176**  -0.187** 
       (0.081)  (0.081) 
  Always wear seat belt      -0.114**  -0.116** 
       (0.056)  (0.056) 
  Top quartile of assets      -0.125*  -0.124* 
       (0.072)  (0.072) 
  3
rd Wealth quartile     -0.070  -0.071 
       (0.071)  (0.071) 
  2
nd Wealth quartile     0.026  0.026 
       (0.071)  (0.071) 
  Constant  -1.459*** -1.490*** -1.188***  -1.213*** 
   (0.034)  (0.037)  (0.081)  (0.082) 
LTCI  Insurance company prediction  -0.694*** -0.781*** -0.431***  -0.522*** 
   (0.123)  (0.126)  (0.128)  (0.131) 
  Individual  prediction   0.547***   0.538*** 
     (0.094)    (0.097) 
  Preventive health activity      0.162*  0.134 
       (0.095)  (0.096) 
  Always wear seat belt      0.234***  0.232*** 
       (0.068)  (0.068) 
  Top quartile of assets      0.592***  0.596*** 
       (0.088)  (0.089) 
  3
rd Wealth quartile     0.424***  0.421*** 
       (0.090)  (0.091) 
  2
nd Wealth quartile     0.275***  0.272*** 
       (0.093)  (0.094) 
  Constant  -1.092*** -1.184*** -1.836***  -1.904*** 
   (0.034)  (0.038)  (0.112)  (0.116) 
  Correlation of two error terms ρ -0.036  -0.044  -0.015 -0.023 
   (0.041)  (0.040)  (0.041)  (0.041) 
  Number of observations  5,000  5,000  5,000  5,000 
  Log-Likelihood -3713.25  -3698.15  -3657.14  -3642.50 
Notes: Estimation of a bivariate probit of any nursing home use (1995-2000) and long-term care insurance coverage (1995).   
***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Our estimates are weighted using the 1995 household weights. 
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Notes: Estimation of a two-type model of any nursing home use (1995-2000) and long-term care insurance coverage (1995).   
***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Our estimates are weighted using the 1995 household weights. 
 
 
  Company predictor 
only 
  Company and Individual 
predictors 
  (1)   (2) 
Type (timid type = 1)        
Preventive health activity  0.308**    0.273* 
 (0.145)    (0.151) 
Always wear seat belt  0.382***    0.393*** 
 (0.104)    (0.104) 
Top quartile of assets  0.852***    0.876*** 
 (0.132)    (0.133) 
3
rd Wealth quartile  0.593***   0.605*** 
  (0.133)   (0.133) 
2
nd Wealth quartile  0.349***   0.355*** 
 (0.133)    (0.134) 
Constant -1.574***    -1.546*** 
 (0.185)    (0.183) 
  Timid type Bold type   Timid type Bold type 
NH          
Insurance company prediction  1.828*** 1.828***    1.798***  1.798*** 
 (0.104)  (0.104)    (0.103)  (0.103) 
Individual prediction        0.211**  0.211** 
       (0.098)  (0.098) 
Constant   -2.288*** -1.269***   -2.254***  -1.303*** 
 (0.215)  (0.061)    (0.239)  (0.063) 
LTCI           
Insurance company prediction  -0.628*** -0.628***   -0.751***  -0.751*** 
 (0.184)  (0.184)    (0.190)  (0.190) 
Individual prediction        0.824***  0.824*** 
       (0.197)  (0.197) 
Constant   -0.269 -2.312***    -0.426** -2.498*** 
 (0.188)  (0.237)    (0.166)  (0.331) 
          
ρ  0.621**     0.566***   
 (0.271)      (0.209)   
Loglikelihood -3658.49      -3643.55   
Number of Obs    5,000      5,000     25
Table 4: Two-type Model: Robustness check 
 
 Constant  Wealth  quartiles 
Preventive activity and Seat 
belt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Pr(timid type = 1)        
Preventive health activity          3.379**  3.306** 
       (1.676)  (1.636) 
Always wear seat belt          2.892**  2.936** 
       (1.331)  (1.390) 
Top quartile of wealth      0.913***  0.944***     
     (0.136)  (0.140)    
3
rd Wealth quartile     0.643***  0.657***    
     (0.129)  (0.132)    
2
nd Wealth quartile     0.387***  0.391***    
     (0.124)  (0.126)    
Constant 0.459***  0.463***  -1.234*** -1.188***  -4.316**  -4.291** 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.189) (0.178) (1.871) (1.898) 
NH (timid type)        
Insurance company    8.763***  8.702*** 1.833*** 1.799*** 1.756*** 1.733*** 
      prediction  (1.462)  (1.409)  (0.101)  (0.105)  (0.091)  (0.092) 
Individual  prediction    0.377*   0.199**  0.206** 
   (0.209)  (0.097)  (0.092) 
Constant 
T c   -8.463*** -8.463*** -2.203*** -2.120*** -1.544*** -1.581*** 
  (1.301) (1.255) (0.237) (0.396) (0.057) (0.061) 
NH (bold type)        
Insurance company    8.763***  8.702*** 1.833*** 1.799*** 1.756*** 1.733*** 
      prediction  (1.462)  (1.409)  (0.101)  (0.105)  (0.091)  (0.092) 
Individual  prediction    0.377*   0.199**  0.206** 
   (0.209)  (0.097)  (0.092) 
Constant 
B c   -1.370*** -1.424*** -1.313*** -1.343*** -1.329*** -1.357*** 
  (0.123) (0.129) (0.061) (0.066) (0.053) (0.055) 
        
LTCI (timid type)        
Insurance company    -0.696***  -0.783*** -0.763*** -0.873*** -0.593*** -0.684*** 
     prediction  (0.124)  (0.127)  (0.213)  (0.215)  (0.125)  (0.128) 
Individual  prediction   0.547***  0.923***  0.525*** 
   (0.094)  (0.275)  (0.096) 
Constant 
T c   -1.100***  -1.185*** -0.089  -0.309 -0.963***  -1.057*** 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.273) (0.209) (0.059) (0.059) 
LTCI (bold type)        
Insurance company    -0.696***  -0.783*** -0.763*** -0.873*** -0.593*** -0.684*** 
     prediction  (0.124)  (0.127)  (0.213)  (0.215)  (0.125)  (0.128) 
Individual  prediction   0.547***  0.923***  0.525*** 
   (0.094)  (0.275)  (0.096) 
Constant 
B c   -1.074*** -1.179*** -2.317*** -2.564*** -1.387*** -1.464*** 
  (0.098) (0.100) (0.256) (0.591) (0.080) (0.082) 
        
ρ  -0.097 -0.096  0.595**  0.472* -0.017 -0.025 
  (0.114) (0.113) (0.266) (0.275) (0.042)  （0.042） 
Loglikelihood -3677.7008  -3663.555  -3673.8107 -3658.1565 -3683.5369 -3669.3261 
Number  of  Obs    5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Notes: The same as Table 3. 
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Table 5: Hausman test: Baseline model vs Robust check 
 
 Baseline  model  vs wealth only     Baseline  model  vs  
Preventive activity & Seat belt only 
 (1)    (2) 








NH and LTCI equations  1.068  1.033    38.302*** 34.243*** 
 (0.998)  (0.999)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Type equation  1.824  2.162    9.185** 8.999** 
 (0.768)  (0.706)    (0.027) (0.029) 
Notes: Table reports the Hausman test statistics and p-values in the parenthesis.     27
 



















NH      
Insurance company prediction  0.400*** 0.396*** 0.376*** 0.370*** 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) 
Individual  prediction   0.041**  0.046** 
   (0.020)  (0.020) 
Preventive health activity      -0.039**  -0.041** 
     (0.018)  (0.018) 
Always wear seat belt      -0.025**  -0.026** 
     (0.012)  (0.012) 
Top quartile of assets      -0.028*  -0.027* 
     (0.016)  (0.016) 
3
rd Wealth quartile     -0.015  -0.016 
     (0.016)  (0.016) 
2
nd Wealth quartile     0.006  0.006 
     (0.016)  (0.016) 
LTCI      
Insurance company prediction  -0.129*** -0.143*** -0.076*** -0.091*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) 
Individual  prediction   0.100***  0.094*** 
   (0.017)  (0.017) 
Preventive health activity      0.029*  0.023 
     (0.017)  (0.017) 
Always wear seat belt      0.041***  0.041*** 
     (0.012)  (0.012) 
Top quartile of assets      0.105***  0.104*** 
     (0.015)  (0.015) 
3
rd Wealth quartile     0.075***  0.074*** 
     (0.016)  (0.016) 
2
nd Wealth quartile     0.049***  0.048*** 
     (0.016)  (0.016) 
Number  of  observations 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Notes: Table reports marginal effects of marginal success probability of entering nursing home and long-tern care insurance coverage 
from bivariate probit estimation of equation (2) and (5).   
***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Our estimates are weighted using the 1995 household weights.   28
 
Table A2: Two-type Model: Marginal Effects 
 
  Company predictor only  Company & Individual predictors 
Type (timid type = 1)    
Preventive health activity  0.106*  0.097 
 (0.062)  (0.061) 
Always wear seat belt  0.127**  0.131** 
 (0.056)  (0.057) 
Top quartile of assets  0.276***  0.286*** 
 (0.099)  (0.100) 
3
rd Wealth quartile  0.195** 0.201** 
  (0.080) (0.080) 
2
nd Wealth quartile  0.118* 0.121* 
 (0.062)  (0.062) 
  Timid type  Bold type  Timid type  Bold type 
NH       
Insurance company prediction  0.555* 1.273*** 0.560* 1.237*** 
  (0.307) (0.206) (0.306) (0.207) 
Individual prediction      0.078  0.132*** 
     (0.068)  (0.042) 
LTCI       
Insurance company prediction  -0.159*** -0.470* -0.200*** -0.552* 
  (0.040) (0.216) (0.053) (0.239) 
Individual prediction      0.278  0.544*** 
     (0.196)  (0.059) 
Number of Obs    5,000    5,000   
Notes: Table reports marginal effects of marginal success probability of entering nursing home and long-tern care insurance coverage 
from two-type model of equation (8), (9) and (13).   
For the type equation, we estimate the marginal success probability of being timid type. 
***, **,* denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.   
Standard errors are calculated by Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
 
 
 